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Abstract—In the development of secure applications, patterns 
are useful in the design of security functionality. Mature 
security products or frameworks are usually employed to 
implement such functionality. Yet, without a deeper 
comprehension of these products, the implementation of 
security patterns is difficult, as a non-guided implementation 
leads to non-deterministic results. In this paper, the Spring 
Security framework is analyzed with the goal of identifying 
supported authentication and authorization patterns. 
Additionally, a best practice guide on implementing the 
identified patterns using the framework is presented. A real 
world case study is presented, in which the findings are 
employed to implement security requirements in a web 
application. With this approach it is possible to overcome the 
gap between pattern-based security design and implementation 
to implement high quality security functionality in software 
systems. 
Keywords - security patterns; security framework; security 
engineering; authorization; authentication 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Security engineering aims for a consecutive secure 
software development by introducing methods, tools, and 
activities into a software development process [1]. As such, 
each phase of the software development needs to consider 
security aspects: in the analysis phase security requirements 
are identified, in the design phase security functionality is 
modeled in conjunction with the main business functionality 
and finally, security solutions are realized in the 
implementation phase. 
Security patterns are an agreed upon method to describe 
best practice solutions for common security problems [2]. 
When designing security functionality for an application 
such patterns can be instantiated in the design model to cover 
a certain security requirement. 
The reuse of existing security functionality, i.e., in the 
form of security components, frameworks or products, is 
considered best practice as well, as they usually cover a great 
percentage of existing security requirements. Their maturity 
can usually not be achieved by implementing it completely 
new, so self-made solutions should extend it as well. By 
doing so, the quality of the security functionality of the 
developed application is increased. Also, as the main focus 
of software development lies upon the implementation of the 
business functionality, the reuse of existing functionality 
increases the efficiency of the implementation process. 
Implementing security patterns using existing security 
functionality is complicated. For one, their built-in flexibility 
to support many different application contexts leads to a high 
complexity, requiring a deep understanding of the internal 
workings. This often raises the question, if and how the 
required security patterns can be implemented with the 
selected product. In such a case, the security functionality 
needs to be analyzed by security experts to determine the 
supported patterns. 
Such an analysis is especially useful, if a model-driven 
approach is used to automatically generate security-related 
artifacts from design models. The identified and supported 
patterns of the framework or product can be used to describe 
the target platform and to generate framework artifacts from 
design models. Such an approach is part of a reuse-based 
security engineering approach, which we outlined in earlier 
works [3]. 
In this paper, the capabilities of the popular open source 
authentication and authorization framework Spring Security 
[4] are examined. The goal thereby is to identify support for 
common pattern by Spring Security and provide a reusable 
catalog of best practice advice on how to implement them in 
a high quality fashion. Theses informal description can be 
used by developers in the need to evaluate security 
frameworks as well as a guide to implementation. Also, they 
can be used to describe formal transformation rules for a 
model-driven approach. 
The rest of this paper is structured as followed: Section 2 
introduces the Spring Security framework and discusses 
related work. In Section 3, the relationship of the pattern-
based framework description to our reuse-based security 
engineering approach is described. The identified security 
patterns and their equivalent implementation using Spring 
Security are covered in Section 4. In Section 5, a real-world 
case study is presented, which shows the security pattern 
implementation using Spring Security. A conclusion and 
outlook on future work closes the body of this paper. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
The following section provides a background on the 
Spring Security framework and discusses related works. 
Figure 1 The main classes of the Spring Security Framework 
A. Background on Spring Security 
Spring Security is an open source Java framework, 
providing highly flexible and extensible authentication, 
authorization, and access control solutions [5][6]. 
The modular framework consists of loosely coupled 
components, which are connected using dependency 
injection. The core classes and their dependencies are shown 
in Figure 1. The Authentication class stores user information. 
It is part of a SecurityContext class for every authenticated 
user in an application. An AuthenticationManager loads this 
data and which verifies the authenticity of users using 
offered credentials and information from a user store [5]. 
To intercept secured resource access, classes extend the 
AbstractSecurityInterceptor class, which is the central class 
in terms of authorization. Thereby, the SecurityContext and 
SecurityMetadataSource classes offer information about the 
current user and the secured object respectively. Access 
decisions are performed by the AccessDecisionManager, 
which is also called by the AbstractSecurityInterceptor. The 
AccessDecisionManager calls voters, which decide whether 
access is granted or not and which can be added dynamically 
to the application. Thus, the voter system abstracts from an 
access control mechanism. 
Although it can be used for desktop applications, the 
main purpose of Spring Security is to secure web 
applications based on the Java Platform Enterprise Edition 
(JEE, [26]). The framework integrates with many 
authentication technologies and standards, e.g., Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Central Authentication 
System (CAS), OpenID and OAuth. Spring Security also 
provides support for basic role-based access control [6]. Due 
to its flexible architecture the framework can easily be 
adapted and extended to support other forms of 
authentication and authorization and access control as well. 
B. Related Work 
Due to the identification of security patterns, the work is 
based on common security pattern literature. A 
comprehensive catalog of abstract and context-specific 
security patterns for, e.g., operating systems, can be found in 
[2]. Identity management as well access control patterns are 
discussed in [7] and [8]. Patterns specific to the JEE platform 
are described in [9]. Authorization patterns for the Extensible 
Access Control Markup language (XACML) are discussed in 
[10]. An excerpt from the patterns presented in these works 
is used in this paper to show their support by the Spring 
Security framework. Pattern based security engineering 
processes are discussed in [11] and [12], yet they do not 
consider the implementation of patterns using security 
platforms. 
An automated retrieval of security patterns in existing 
software, such as discussed in [13] and [14], would be useful 
in the identification process. Unfortunately, the retrieval rate 
of the approaches is still to low to be useful for our goals. 
Applying them would only show the patterns implemented in 
the software not all possibilities of the security framework. 
This is why a manual approach was applied. 
The pattern-based platform description presented here is 
a feasible enhancement to model-driven security approaches, 
which is not considered by other such approaches, e.g., 
[15][16][17]. We aim at describing the target security 
platform using security patterns, to simplify the 
transformations and easily adapt them to new platforms. 
Background information on the Spring Security 
framework, its inner relations and concepts as well as its 
usage can be found in the community documentation as well 
as in [5] and [6]. These descriptions are not based on security 
patterns and do not show all possible applications of the 
framework. 
III. REUSE-BASED SECURITY ENGINEERING 
The pattern-based identification and description of 
security functionality in existing frameworks is part of a 
reuse-oriented security engineering approach, presented in 
[3]. We argue for reuse of existing security functionality as 
well as knowledge throughout the phases of development 
processes to increase the quality and the development 
efficiency of the implemented software artifacts. Security 
problems, which can not be covered by existing models and 
functionality, can benefit from a reuse approach by 
extending or adapting them to a new context. 
For one, the reuse of knowledge about possible threats 
and attacks against information resources, as well as 
appropriate countermeasures, is feasible in the analysis of 
security requirements of an application. 
The topic discussed in this paper covers the design and 
implementation phase of the engineering process. In the 
design phase existing security knowledge should be used to 
determine possible solutions for security problems. Security 
patterns offer a proven method for describing such best 
practice solutions and can be integrated with common design 
patterns [2]. The implementation of security solutions should 
be based on existing security functionality, e.g., provided by 
products, frameworks or components. These are more mature 
and field tested, than a new implementation and usually offer 
support for existing security standards and technologies.  
Yet, to support the security engineering process, there is 
a need for knowledge of the frameworks used for securing 
the software product. During the design phase, knowledge 
about patterns that are supported by a framework is needed 
in order to avoid incompatibilities between design and 
implementation. When implementing the design it is 
beneficial to know how to implement a pattern with a 
framework. This leads to the need of pattern identification in 
security frameworks. 
IV. AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION PATTERN 
IDENTIFICATION 
The following section describes the pattern identification 
and implementation process using the Spring Security 
framework. A focus was put on authentication and 
authorization patterns, as these are the focus of the 
framework as well. Thereby a distinction is made between 
the format of security guidelines describing policy patterns, 
and architectural patterns, describing components using and 
evaluating the policies. 
The patterns were identified manually by using practical 
experience on securing applications with the framework, its 
openly accessible source code and reference documentation 
as well as a book about the framework [5]. The selected 
patterns to identify in the framework cover several areas 
within authentication and authorization. Another reason in 
favor for the selection is their publicity. Commonly known 
patterns were selected from [2] and [9]. 
A. Authentication Patterns Description 
The patterns described in this chapter are supporting 
decisions in the software development process concerning 
authentication. 
1) Authentication Policy Patterns 
We have not found an abstract authentication pattern 
description in the aforementioned literature, which we deem 
relevant. The Authentication Information pattern defines, that 
a subject has to deliver some sort of information to prove an 
association to an identity in an application. 
In [9], several mechanisms to authenticate a subject are 
specified, which offer three specializations of the pattern. 
The distinction is made on what kind of prove has to be 
presented, i.e., the subject deliver information it knows, e.g., 
a username and password, it owns, e.g., from a smartcard, or 
intrinsically has or is, e.g., finger prints. Lastly, the fourth 
specialization of the Authentication Information pattern is 
the combination of any two or more of these three 
concretions, which is called multi factor authentication. 
2) Authentication Architectural Patterns 
Information about known identities needs to be stored for 
comparison with user input. The abstract User Store pattern 
[9] defines, that user information is stored in some kind of 
repository. Depending on the type of authentication 
mechanism different implementations of the User Store are 
required. A LDAP directory or a database, containing 
usernames and passwords, are examples of User Store 
pattern implementation. 
Enforcing the authentication needs specification of the 
required components in the software architecture and their 
interplay. The Authentication Enforcer pattern [9] describes 
these components and their interaction in a web-based 
application. The pattern abstracts from the applied 
authentication mechanism, defined through the policies, to 
enhance reuse. Another aim of the pattern is to centralize 
authentication functionality and therefore to reduce 
redundancy. 
The main component is the eponymous Authentication 
Enforcer, to which authentication requests of the client are 
sent to. It takes the information offered by the clients from 
the request context and compares it to data in the user store. 
On successful verification, a subject containing information 
gained from the user store on the subject is created. 
B. Authentication Patterns Identification 
The main interface for implementing the Authentication 
Information pattern is the Spring Security Authentication 
interface, as its implementation offers information depending 
on the authentication mechanism. The Authentication 
interface is closely coupled to the AuthenticationProvider 
that loads the user information. 
Accessing storages with the Spring Security framework, 
as required by the User Store pattern, is achieved through 
different implementations of the AuthenticationProvider 
interface. Each implementation represents a different User 
Store and uses varying Authentication concretions, e.g., the 
OpenIDAuthenticationProvider offers OpenID 
authentication by creating an OpenIDAuthenticationToken 
that implements the Authentication interface. The 
AuthenticationManager uses the AuthenticationProvider to 
verify authenticity of users. An AuthenticationManager and 
its AuthenticationProviders can be configured using XML. 
An example configuration is shown in Figure 2. The default 
authentication manager is used and the custom authentication 
provider class can be inserted. 
In Spring Security, the Authentication Enforcer pattern is 
implemented using the filter chain mechanism introduced by 
 
(a) Authentication Enforcer Pattern 
 
(b) Spring Security Implementation of Authentication Enforcer Pattern 
Figure 2 Authentication Enforcer Pattern and Implementation with 
Spring Security 
the Java Servlet Specification [18]. The DefaultLoginPage-
GeneratingFilter is executed if the login URL of the 
application is called and renders a login page to the client. 
When the client sends the rendered login form, the 
UsernamePasswordAuthenticationFilter tries to authenticate 
the client using the configured AuthenticationManager. 
Another example is the BasicAuthenticationFilter, which 
gets the username and password from the request according 
to RFC 1945 [19] and verifies authenticity. There are also 
filters for CAS or OpenID authentication, because they 
depend on an external user store and therefore must be 
treated differently. Due to the statelessness of HTTP, the 
SecurityContextPersistenceFilter is needed, which persists 
the security context including the authentication in the HTTP 
session before responding to a request and recovers the 
security context at the beginning of the next request. 
Writing an own filter for supporting, e.g., biometric 
authentication is possible, too. For each filter specified in the 
filter chain, there must be a Java class with the same name. 
The filter chain and authentication provider offers flexibility 
in adding new authentication mechanisms and user stores 
needed to support the Authentication Enforcer pattern. 
C. Authorization Patterns Description 
This section introduces patterns that can be used to 
describe or enforce authorization. Because there is a close 
relationship between authentication and authorization, some 
architectural patterns require authentication or even offer it. 
1) Authorization Policy Patterns 
The Authorization pattern [2] is used to define access 
control for resources at a high level of abstraction. A subject 
is assigned a right for a resource. High level of abstraction 
means, that subject, right and resource are not specified 
concretely and can be of any kind. 
The direct interpretation of the Authorization pattern is 
called Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC [2]). Due to the 
structure, the concrete Subject gets directly assigned a 
Permission to access a Resource in a specific way. Thus a 
fine-grained definition of access control is established. 
Usually IBAC is implemented using access control lists 
(ACL). 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), described as a 
pattern in [2], is a specialization of the Authorization pattern, 
which refines the right assignment. Instead of directly 
assigning rights, a Subject gets assigned a Role, which 
TABLE I.  SUPPORTED AUTHENTICATION PATTERNS 
Authentication Patterns Spring Security Implementation 
Authentication Information 
 Single and multi-factor 
authentication using username-
password, OpenID, X.509 
certificates, HTTP Basic and Digest 
authentication (native) 
 adaptable to other authentication 
methods using  3rd party frameworks 
User Store 
 XML configuration, LDAP, 
Database, properties file (native) 
 adaptable to 3rd party user store 
Authentication Enforcer  Authentication filters for Java Servlet filter mechanisms 
 
(a) Role-Based Access Control Pattern 
 
(b) Implementing Role-Based Access Control with Spring Security 
 
(c) Policy Enforcement Point Pattern 
 
(d) Spring Security Implementation of Policy Enforcement Point for 
Method Access 
Figure 3 Authorization Patterns in Spring Security 
represents a set of Permissions to access a Resource. Thus, it 
is possible to assign Subjects with the same access rights 
using Roles among a system reducing the complexity of 
rights management. 
Another concretion of the Authorization pattern is 
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC [20]). In contrast to 
RBAC, Permission can be defined through expressions using 
all available Attributes of Subject, Resource or Environment. 
2) Authorization Architectural Patterns 
Besides defining authorization policies, there are patterns 
describing their enforcement, i.e., access control. An abstract 
example for enforcement of access control is the Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP) pattern, also known as Reference 
Monitor [2][21]. The PEP defines components and flows 
needed to control access to a resource in an abstract way. 
Requests to a Protected Resource shall be intercepted by the 
PEP. According to Authorization Rules, which consist of 
Authorization items, access is granted or denied. 
Another concretion of the PEP is the Authorization 
Enforcer pattern [9]. The purpose of the pattern is to control 
access in a JEE application. Due to this circumstance, there 
are several variations of the pattern using different Java 
specifications. Requests from a Client are intercepted and 
redirected to the Authorization Enforcer, which uses the 
Authentication Provider to set the Permissions to the already 
loaded Subject. Thus the pattern needs an authenticated 
Subject, e.g., set by the Authentication Enforcer pattern. 
With the Permissions of the Subject, the Authorization 
Enforcer decides, whether the access is granted or rejected. 
The Intercepting Web Agent (IWA) pattern [9] helps in 
separating application logic from authorization and 
authentication logic. It can also be used to add access control 
and authentication after the development of an application. 
The name already suggests that the patterns operational area 
is web application development. Client requests are 
intercepted by the eponymous IWA. Either the Client 
authenticates itself and its authentication information is 
persisted through a cookie or the Client tries to access a 
Resource directly, in which case the IWA loads the 
previously persisted information of the Subject. The request 
is forwarded by the IWA, if the Subject is authorized. 
D. Implementation of Authorization Patterns 
The following section discusses implementing the 
authorization patterns with the Spring Security framework. 
1) Policy Pattern 
Due to the voter mechanism used for access decisions, 
the framework can be enhanced to support several access 
control patterns, thus it supports the Authorization pattern. 
The sections about ABAC, RBAC, and IBAC show different 
voters supported by the framework and indicate the 
flexibility. By implementing an AccessDecisionVoter, it is 
possible to access external frameworks or software and to 
gain extra information needed for the decision or to ask for 
the decision from external software. 
RBAC raises the need for defining Roles of Users. In 
Spring Security Roles are called (Granted-) Authorities [5]. 
Authorities can be assigned to Users via configuration or 
loaded from a User Store [5]. A documented best practice is 
the arrangement of Authorities into hierarchies [6]. Roles are 
assigned to Users and Rights are assigned to Roles. Thus a 
hierarchy is built and Users are assigned several Rights 
through their Role. 
Rights are assigned to Roles to access a Resource. Spring 
Security supports the protection of methods and URLs as 
Resources [5]. In the configuration or annotation the 
corresponding Right is used, as can be seen in Figure 2 (c) 
and (d). Thus only Users with a Role having the Right to 
modify a resource are allowed to access it. When 
implementing a web application based on the REST 
(Representational State Transfer) paradigm [22], the 
approach of protecting URLs is preferred. Otherwise, 
method security and the use of annotations according to the 
Java Specification Request (JSR) 250 should be used. Thus, 
the flexibility in changing the security framework is saved. 
ABAC is not directly supported by Spring Security, but 
can be easily implemented as shown next. Spring Security 
offers the Spring Expression Language (SpEL [5]) to 
describe access control. Instead of annotating a right to 
methods or to a URL, expressions can be used. When 
evaluating to True, access is granted. In SpEL expressions, 
Attributes of the Subject or the Resource can be used and 
compared, e.g., “authentication.id=#resource.ownerId“, 
which evaluates to True, if the users owns the resource.  
These expressions can be combined with “and” and “or”. 
In general, the SpEL fulfills the requirements of the 
application. When using more complex ABAC expressions, 
SpEL in combination with PermissionEvaluators can be 
used. For that, the expression “hasPermission” can be used 
[5], for each of which the processing AccessDecisionVoter 
calls appropriate PermissionEvaluators. Implementing a 
PermissionEvaluator closes the gap between the needs of 
ABAC and the Spring Security access control 
implementation. The implementation of the Permission-
Evaluator interface can access any Attribute of the Subject, 
Resource and Environment. 
Spring Security offers the use of Access Control Lists 
(ACL), which are commonly used to implement IBAC [2]. In 
[5], the set up of a database, holding the ACL and the 
configuration of Spring Security to use a database, is shown. 
For each Resource an Access Control Entry can be added to 
the database, giving specific Permissions to a Subject. Built-
in permissions are read, write, create, delete and administer. 
These Permissions can be enhanced or replaced [5]. Besides 
ACL and its Entries, the protected URLs have to be 
configured or methods have to be annotated. This is done 
using the “hasPermission” SpEL expression [5]. 
2) Architectural Patterns 
The previous section showed the definition of 
authorization policies with Spring Security and merely parts 
of their enforcement. The framework uses a concrete PEP 
for URLs and for method access control respectively. The 
PEP has to handle all requests on a Protected Object. A filter 
(FilterSecurityInterceptor) is used to intercept requests on 
URLs and to control access on the URL. The filter 
implements the AbstractSecurityInterceptor. Thus requests 
on URLs are handled as described in Section II.A. 
<user name="student1"... authorities="ROLE_STUDENT" /> 
<user name="admin" ... authorities="ROLE_ADMIN" /> 
(a) User definition and role assignment 
<bean id="rightsToRoles" 
 class="oss.access.hierarchicalroles.RoleHierarchyImpl"> 
 <property name="hierarchy"> 
 ROLE_ADMIN >ROLE_STUDENT 
 ROLE_STUDENT > PERM_DELETE_POI 
 … 
 </property> 
</bean> 
(b) Role definition and permission assignment 
@RolesAllowed("PERM_DELETE_POI") 
public void delete(PointOfInterest poi) { … } 
(c) Configuring access control on a method using annotations 
<http use-expressions=”true”> 
 <intercept-url pattern=”/poi/*/delete” 
  access=”hasRole(PERM_DELETE_POI)”/> 
</http> 
(d) Configuring access control on URLs 
Figure 4 Implementing Role-Based Access Control in Spring Security 
(unnecessary information is stripped with “…”) 
Requests on methods are intercepted using the Spring 
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [23] feature. The 
Spring AnnotationSecurityAspect enhances security 
annotated methods. The advice of the aspect redirects 
method calls to the AspectMethodSecurityInterceptor, which 
is an implementation of the AbstractSecurityInterceptor 
interface, as well. 
Thus, requests to URLs and methods are intercepted by 
the Spring Security framework and processed to enforce 
access control. The AuthorizationRules are described by the 
AuthorizationPolicy that is used. Method annotation and 
expressions in configuration for URLs describe the concrete 
Authorization for a Resource. The PEP pattern is used with 
Spring Security, if the Authorization pattern is set up and the 
FilterChain is configured or method security is activated [5]. 
The Authorization Enforcer pattern is the concretion of 
the PEP for Java EE applications. Thus, the mentioned 
protection of methods and URLs is an implementation of the 
pattern. The Spring Security AuthenticationManager takes 
the role of the Authentication Provider and the several 
authentication filters as well as the AuthorizationManager 
represent the Authorization Enforcer role. Thus, the 
Authorization Enforcer pattern can be implemented by using 
Spring Security access control. The Intercepting Web Agent 
pattern cannot be applied to the method protection, because 
the pattern defines application execution after access control. 
Thus the implementation of the pattern is applied through 
configuration of the Authentication Enforcer pattern, the 
Authorization pattern and a configured URL protection. 
E. Discussion 
The examination of the Spring Security framework 
revealed support for most known security patterns but failed 
to offer developers guidance on their implementation. This 
handicap has been overcome, as the proposed security 
pattern implementation templates enable the efficient 
mapping of pattern-based security design in future 
development processes. Thus, it allows security knowledge 
reuse as proposed by our security engineering approach 
described in Section III. 
The identification process was thereby laborious as an 
intensive black box as well as white box examination of the 
framework was performed. This was only possible due to the 
excellent documentation and access to the framework’s 
source code, which is not always the case, e.g., with 
proprietary frameworks, and makes the identification more 
difficult. 
We tried to document the templates as independent of 
any application context as possible and in the 
implementation case study, discussed in the next section, we 
found that the templates are well crafted and suitable. But we 
do not claim completeness or efficiency. In fact, the 
templates as well as the pattern to implementation mapping 
may need to be adjusted to fit a specific context as well as 
future versions of the framework. 
V. IMPLEMENTING CASE STUDY 
The knowledge described in the previous sections 
combined with, e.g., use cases, misuse cases and component 
diagrams has been applied to the development of the security 
functionality of a web application. Spring Security was used 
as the security platform used to protect the application. 
A. KITCampusGuide Scenario Descriptions 
The KITCampusGuide application is a navigation tool 
supporting students, teachers and staff in finding and 
navigating to points of interest (POI), i.e., any kind of 
landmark, such as a canteen, an auditorium or offices. Due to 
restricted areas on the campus and several other 
requirements, the search for and display of POIs has to be 
restricted. Users should be able to create private POIs, which 
can only be seen and modified by themselves. As such, 
management of POIs is the most relevant to security. 
B. Secure Development of a POI Manager Component 
A POI Management component was developed by 
modeling the requirements using UML use cases. Security 
analysis resulted in a need for user authentication and 
authorization, when creating private POIs. An architectural 
decision was made to use a single factor authentication using 
username-password pairs and RBAC for authorization 
policies. The security functionality is independent from the 
TABLE II.  SUPPORTED AUTHORIZATION PATTERNS 
Authorization Patterns Spring Security Implementation 
Role-Based Access Control  Hierarchical roles using GrantedAuthorities 
Identitty-Based Access Control  Access Control Lists 
Attribute-Based Access Control  Simplified implementation using Spring Expression Language 
Authorization Enforcer  Aspect interceptor for method access 
Intercepting Web Agent  Filter mechanism of Java Servlets for URL access 
functional logic and supports access control to restrict access 
using an IWA. The architecture model was enhanced using 
the appropriate pattern descriptions. 
Using the previously acquired knowledge about security 
patterns supported by the Spring Security framework, the 
security functionality was implemented by providing 
appropriate configurations to the framework and applying 
annotations to relevant methods. Figure 2 shows the 
necessary configurations to implement RBAC for a delete 
operation on POIs. Thereby two roles are defined and 
assigned to two different users. The role "ROLE_ADMIN" 
inherits the permissions of the role "ROLE_STUDENT", 
which in the shown example includes the permission to 
delete a POI. This is controlled using an annotation for the 
"delete" method as well as an authorization filter for the 
URL-based "delete" operation. 
C. Problems and Experiences 
Finding the level of abstraction needed for the 
application is an important issue during design phase. In the 
case study the whole development process was traversed by 
a single person and the application size was manageable. But 
as the size of the application grows, this could lead to 
problems. A hierarchy of patterns indicated in the previous 
chapters would close the gap between a high level of 
abstraction and a level close to implementation. This is 
helpful in concretizing the design step by step. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, the open source security framework Spring 
Security was examined in its support for common security 
patterns for authentication and authorization. Patterns for 
RBAC and ABAC as well as for username/password-based 
authentication were identified and appropriate best-practice 
implementation templates for Spring Security were provided. 
These templates can be used as a reference to implement the 
mentioned patterns in other projects. Further, the benefits of 
a pattern-based security framework description for a model-
driven approach were discussed and its role in a reuse-based 
security engineering process was briefly explained. 
In continuation of this work, the possible security design 
and implementation decisions need to be captured in flexible 
variation models to provide a decision support. Also, the 
relationships between the patterns will be determined and 
specified to identify mandatory or optional dependencies 
between the design and implementation patterns. In future 
research, we focus on completing the different parts of our 
reuse-based security engineering process. 
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